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BRANDEIS:  THE LEGACY OF A JUSTICE 
 JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN* AND CHARLES A. MILLER**
One hundred years after his appointment, Justice Louis D. Brandeis re-
mains a distinctive and unusually influential figure in the history of the Su-
preme Court. Unlike many other great justices, Brandeis is not remembered 
for his majority opinions. Rather, what is distinctive about him is the extent to 
which so many of his dissents and concurring opinions continue to influence 
justices more than 75 years after he retired and a century after he joined the 
Court. Whereas justices cite majority opinions for their value as legal prece-
dents, they invoke the dissents and concurrences of a retired justice due to the 
power of his or her ideas or the credibility of his or her reputation. Signifi-
cantly, Brandeis's successors continue to turn to his classic dissents and con-
currences more often than to the discretionary opinions of other justices. 
Their continuing reliance on Brandeis confirms the insight of Paul Freund, 
one of the Justice’s most distinguished law clerks that Brandeis remains "the 
most powerful moral teacher" to have served on the Court. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The centennial of Justice Louis D. Brandeis’s appointment to the Supreme 
Court provides an appropriate occasion to consider his judicial legacy.  Wood-
row Wilson’s nomination of Brandeis on January 28, 1916,1 to fill the vacan-
cy caused by the death of Justice Joseph Rucker Lamar provoked immediate 
controversy and led to a contentious confirmation battle.2  Seven former pres-
idents of the American Bar Association including William Howard Taft pub-
licly declared Brandeis unfit for the Court.3  The two Senate committees 
charged with considering the nomination approved it by a single vote in each 
instance before the Senate ultimately confirmed Brandeis, 47–22 on June 1, 
1916.4  Yet long before Brandeis retired from the Court on February 13, 1939, 
he was regarded as one of its seminal justices, a recognition that has endured 
for more than three-quarters of a century since then.5
Yet Brandeis’s judicial legacy defies conventional measures.  Unlike 
Chief Justices John Marshall, Charles Evans Hughes, and Earl Warren, he did 
not, through the force of his personality or an ability to forge consensus, shape 
the course of the Supreme Court by cobbling together majorities on constitu-
tional issues.  Nor did he make his mark through the number of canonical ma-
jority opinions he left behind.6  There were few such opinions.  His concur-
rences and dissents, which the Court later used to mold new and enduring 
doctrine, left a wider imprint.  Yet, significant though some of these contribu-
tions were, even they do not properly reflect the legacy of Justice Brandeis’s 
twenty-three years on the Court.  Often the Court moved towards the result he 
1. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 465 (1946).
2. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME
COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 141–44 (5th ed. 2008). 
3. MASON, supra note 1, at 489.
4. See generally A.L. TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS (1964).
5. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 2, 373–76 (summarizing various efforts to rank Supreme
Court justices which place Brandeis in the “great” category); LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL,
HAROLD J. SPAETH, AND THOMAS G. WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA,
DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS 464, 465 (6th ed. 2015) (summarizing various efforts to rank justic-
es virtually all of which place Brandeis in “great” category); Jeffrey Rosen, Why Brandeis Matters,
NEW REPUBLIC (June 28, 2010), https://newrepublic.com/article/75902/why-brandeis-matters 
[https://perma.cc/3LY9-NEGF] (calling Brandeis “the greatest constitutional philosopher of the 
twentieth century”); Anthony Lewis, A Hero of American Justice, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
(Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2010/02/11/a-hero-of-american-justice/
[https://perma.cc/RP9X-SHJF] (calling Brandeis “perhaps the most brilliant of all Supreme Court 
justices”).
6. See Lee Epstein et al., Rating the Justices: Lessons from Another Court, in Annual Meeting
Midwest Political Sci. Assoc. (Chicago, Illinois) (Apr. 18, 1992), 
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/conferencepapers.1992MPSA.pdf [https://perma.cc/63ZV-PG2D] 
(reporting the top ten authors of significant majority opinions, which does not include Brandeis). 
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suggested without embracing his approach, and some of those victories have 
proved fleeting. 
Rather, Justice Brandeis’s judicial legacy was, as Paul A. Freund put it, as 
“the most powerful moral teacher ever to have sat on our highest court.”7
That assessment continues to describe Brandeis’s impact half a century after 
Freund wrote that judgment.  Brandeis used his judicial opinions to express 
fundamental constitutional values in a profound and memorable way.  As 
Freund put it in 1978, “while Brandeis was without doubt essentially a moral-
ist, he was a moralist with a difference . . . .  He was, in short, a moralist-cum-
lawyer, whose special genius it was to perceive moral issues in what others 
saw as vast impersonal, inevitable trends, and to devise institutional arrange-
ments designed to salvage moral values in a modern technological age.”8
When Justice Brandeis used concurring and dissenting opinions to illumi-
nate moral issues, these discretionary writings provided the opportunity for 
him to identify and speak to recurring moral questions in an instructive way.9
The enduring quality of these expositions is demonstrated, in part, by the fre-
quency with which modern jurists and others continue to cite them for the 
light they shed on contemporary problems or the support they lend to their 
discussions.10
Yet the power of Brandeis’s articulated moral teachings constitutes only 
part of his judicial legacy.  Less tangible than those gems of his judicial prose, 
yet also important, Brandeis’s work demonstrated how a conscientious judge 
can apply values in a principled fashion as they arise in cases before the 
Court.  A century after his appointment to the Court, his moral insights con-
tinue to inform discussion of constitutional law, and his performance provides 
a model for judicial behavior. 
This essay continues in Section II by placing Brandeis’s discretionary 
opinions in the context of his judicial service.  Section III discusses the impact 
of Brandeis’s dissents and concurrences in shaping subsequent doctrine and in 
articulating foundational concepts for judicial and extra-judicial discussion. 
Section IV addresses Brandeis’s judicial behavior.  Section V provides con-
7. Paul A. Freund, An Appreciation of Justice Brandeis, 11 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 4, 5 (1966); cf.
Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, in MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 47, 124 (Fe-
lix Frankfurter ed., 1932) (“In truth, Mr. Justice Brandeis is a moral teacher . . . .”). 
8. Paul A. Freund, Justice Brandeis: A Law Clerk’s Remembrance, 68 AM. JEWISH HISTORY 7,
7 (1978); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: ESSAYS ON MORALITY IN POLITICS
250 (2005) (listing Brandeis along with Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, 
John C. Calhoun, Abraham Lincoln, Frederick Douglass, Jane Addams, and Oliver Wendell Holmes 
as having produced “most notable expressions of American political thought”). 
9. See discussion infra Section III.B.
10. See infra Sections III.C, III.D.
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clusions.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS’S JUDICIAL WORK
The observer may be surprised at the paucity of monumental majority 
opinions Justice Brandeis wrote for the Court during his twenty-three years of 
service.  The absence of more such opinions did not reflect a tendency by 
Brandeis to dissent.  On the contrary, he usually joined in the Court’s resolu-
tions.  The overwhelming number of his published judicial opinions—some 
457 of his 531 or 86%—were majority opinions.11
Many of Brandeis’s opinions resolved important issues of law.  For in-
stance, in Jacob Rupert, Inc. v. Caffey,12 he spoke for a 6–3 majority in up-
holding the power of Congress to prohibit, as a war measure, the use of cer-
tain products in manufacturing liquor.  In O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,13 he wrote for a 5–4 majority in applying a pre-
sumption of constitutionality to uphold a New Jersey insurance regulation 
against attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
As will be suggested below, Brandeis had frequently criticized the Court’s use 
of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to strike 
down regulatory measures early in his tenure on the Court, but it was only 
President Herbert Hoover’s appointments of Charles Evans Hughes and Owen 
Roberts to the Court in 1930 that created the possibility that Brandeis could 
express his view on the due process clauses in a majority opinion.14  His opin-
ion in O’Gorman did not end the Court’s aggressive use of substantive due 
process to strike down regulatory measures, a practice that continued for a 
few more years.15  Yet the opinion helped erode the underpinnings of the lib-
erty of contract doctrine that the Court had used during the first third of the 
twentieth century to strike down federal and state economic regulation.16  In 
11. We have calculated Brandeis’s number of opinions from information provided at the web-
site of the Louis D. Brandeis Collection at the Louis D. Brandeis School of Law Library. The Col-
lected Supreme Court Opinions of Louis D. Brandeis, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS SCHOOL OF LAW
LIBRARY (last visited Nov. 15, 2016), http://louisville.edu/law/library/special-collections/the-louis-
d.-brandeis-collection/the-collected-supreme-court-opinions-of-louis-d.-brandeis 
[https://perma.cc/5YU9-SE5U].  But see MASON, supra note 1, at 627–28 (reporting that Brandeis 
wrote 454 majority opinions and 528 opinions); Epstein et al., supra note 5, at 632 (reporting that 
Brandeis wrote 455 opinions for the Court, 10 concurrences, and 65 dissents for a total of 530 opin-
ions).
12. 251 U.S. 264 (1920).
13. 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
14. See discussion infra Section III.A.
15. See, e.g., New State Ice v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (using Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause to strike down Oklahoma law regulating sale of ice without license). 
16. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 76–105 (1998) (describing role of O’Gorman in eroding substantive 
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Lynch v. United States17 and Louisville Bank v. Radford,18 Brandeis wrote for 
a unanimous Court in striking down New Deal legislation for taking private 
property for public use without just compensation in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.  In Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5,19 he wrote 
for a 5–4 majority in upholding a Wisconsin statute that allowed peaceful 
picketing to publicize labor disputes against an attack that it violated the Four-
teenth Amendment.  Brandeis’s opinion provided part of the basis for subse-
quent Court decisions eroding the restrictions the Taft Court had imposed on 
union activity.20
Yet only one of Brandeis’s majority opinions, that in Erie v. Tompkins,21
was truly historic.  That decision overruled the ninety-six-year-old precedent, 
Swift v. Tyson,22 and held that the invocation of the federal court’s diversity 
subject matter jurisdiction did not authorize the federal court to fashion a 
“federal general common law.”  Instead, a federal court in a diversity case 
was bound to follow the law, whether statutory or decisional, which the high-
est state court in that state would apply.23
Erie was, to be sure, a singular decision that restored some rationality and 
consistency to law by eliminating the incentive to forum-shop, which Swift 
had inadvertently created.24 Erie left its own problems to be solved but, at 
least the applicable law would not vary depending on whether a federal or 
state tribunal had decided the case.25
Brandeis’s dearth of path-blazing majority opinions sets him apart from 
other consequential justices.  It was not simply the great chief justices like 
Marshall, Hughes, and Warren who wrote many enduring majority opinions. 
Other associate justices, such as Hugo Black, William J. Brennan, Jr., Lewis 
due process). 
17. 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
18. 295 U.S. 555, 601–02 (1935).
19. 301 U.S. 468, 482–83 (1937).
20. See, e.g., A.F.L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 326 (1941) (citing Senn, 301 U.S. at 478, for First
Amendment protection of picketing); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (citing Senn,
301 U.S. at 478, and Brandeis regarding picketing as protected speech).
21. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
22. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
23. 304 U.S. at 78.
24. See, e.g., id. at 73–75.
25. See TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 143–64 (1981) (discussing difficulties occasioned by Erie and criticizing Brandeis’s 
claim that the Court had been acting unconstitutionally since Swift). But see EDWARD A. PURCELL,
JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE 
POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 114 (2000) (defending
Brandeis’s opinion in Erie); Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 
10 J.L., ECON. & POL’Y 17 (2013) (providing general defense of Brandeis’s arguments in Erie).
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F. Powell, Jr., Potter Stewart, and Byron White, wrote more important majori-
ty opinions than Brandeis.26  Indeed, some of those with whom Brandeis 
served for extended periods, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes,27 Harlan Fiske 
Stone,28 Benjamin Cardozo,29 and even George Sutherland30 and Owen Rob-
erts,31 wrote more often for the Court on significant matters than did Brandeis. 
Circumstance more than anything else limited the number of Brandeis’s 
historic majority opinions.  The Court on which he served decided fewer con-
stitutional cases than has been true in more recent times.  The Court’s con-
servative composition for most of his tenure dictated that he would often be in 
the minority in the Court’s controversial constitutional cases.32  And even 
when Brandeis found himself in the majority on such matters, institutional 
reasons dictated that others generally wrote the most significant decisions, 
such as Holmes, 33 who was more senior; Hughes, 34 who, as Chief Justice, 
brought symbolic importance to opinions he wrote and who possessed opin-
ion-assigning authority; or Roberts, 35 who often was the swing vote.  
Although Brandeis is often portrayed as a great dissenter, he had a general 
aversion to dissenting, especially in cases that did not involve the Constitu-
tion.36  He rarely wrote dissenting (or even concurring) opinions.37  Brandeis 
26. Epstein, et al., Rating the Justices, supra note 6, at 18.
27. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
28. See, e.g., Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939); United States v. Caro-
lene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 
(1938); United States v. Louisiana, 290 U.S. 70 (1933). 
29. See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619 (1937); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). 
30. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 
U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
31. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45
(1935); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
32. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
U.S. 517 (1933); Myers Adm’x v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
33. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927).
34. See, e.g., Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 397 (1937); The Gold Clause Cases, 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Home 
Bldg. and Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
35. See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502.
36. See generally Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 299, 314–15 (Brandeis, arguing against dissents in non-constitutional cases); Robert Post, The
Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in 
the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1314, 1386 (2001) (showing that Brandeis joined about 93% 
of the opinions of the Taft Court); id. at 1387, 1388 (showing that Brandeis changed more than 50% 
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often withheld a separate expression of his views if the Court’s opinion was 
modified to reflect his concerns, at least in part, and sometimes simply to be a 
good institutional citizen.38  Only 12% of his opinions were dissents and less 
than 2% were concurrences.39  He averaged fewer than three dissenting opin-
ions per term.40  In fact, most of his dissents came during the first two-thirds 
of his service, when Edward White and William Howard Taft were chief jus-
tices of rather conservative Courts.41  He wrote seventeen dissents from opin-
ions during his five terms on the White Court and forty-two dissents during 
his nine terms on the Taft Court, and only five while serving for eight terms 
with Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes.42
Yet this small portion of Brandeis’s judicial workload has had a dispro-
portionate impact on his judicial reputation.  For, as Justice Robert H. Jackson 
later observed, Brandeis was “distinguished . . . not for the frequency of his 
dissents, but for their strength—not for their number, but for their quality.”43
Once Brandeis joined the Court, he limited his published writings about 
law to his judicial opinions.  He did not write law review articles or give aca-
demic speeches or media interviews.  Moreover, in writing dissents and con-
currences, he was not constrained by the institutional responsibility of speak-
ing for a majority and the consequent obligation to conform his ideas to the 
limits of consensus.  In these discretionary opinions, he was free to share the 
insights that were the unique product of his mind and experience.  As Walton 
H. Hamilton put it, “The dissent is his own utterance, unconfused by the need 
of voicing the opinions of others; it is not the law, but the law as he would 
of his conference vote dissents during the Taft Court to join Court opinion). 
37. See supra text accompanying note 11 and note 11.
38. PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 369–70 (1984); Urofsky,
Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, supra note 36, at 309, 328 (Brandeis describing when he with-
holds a dissent); see also Post, supra note 36, at 1274 (identifying presumptive norm on Taft Court 
for justices to join Court opinions notwithstanding disagreement to foster Court’s influence and pres-
tige); id. at 1284 (citing Canon of Judicial Ethics in 1920s calling for judges on courts of last resort to 
“use effort and self-restraint” to promote consensus). 
39. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
40. See id.
41. See generally The Collected Supreme Court Opinions of Louis D. Brandeis, supra note 11.
42. See generally id.  Brandeis also rarely wrote concurring opinions.  His ten concurring opin-
ions came at an average of less than one every other year and in fact were bunched in six Court terms 
with three each coming in the 1926 and 1935 terms. 
43. Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Ct. of the U.S., Tribute to Louis D.
Brandeis, The Man, at the 39th Annual Convention of Hadassah in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 26, 1953) 
(transcript available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/wp-content/uploads/migrated-
files/thecenter/files/bibliography/1950s/tribute-to-louis-d.-brandeis,-the-man.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QP65-XNPC]); see also MASON, supra note 1, at 628 (stating that Brandeis’s “dis-
senting opinions are of quality, not quantity”). 
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have it be.”44  This observation applied equally to Brandeis’s concurrences.  
Brandeis produced his most powerful and enduring moral teachings in these 
discretionary opinions. 
III. THE IMPACT OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS’S DISCRETIONARY OPINIONS
A. The Source of Future Doctrine 
Brandeis’s concurrences and dissents helped shape doctrine the Court later 
adopted, in some cases even while he was still on the Court.45  For instance, 
once he joined the Court, Brandeis inherited Holmes’s role as the most con-
sistent judicial voice criticizing the Court’s aggressive use of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to strike down state legislation regulating economic matters dur-
ing the Lochner era.46  He called instead for judicial deference to such legisla-
tive decisions.47  Thus, in Brandeis’s second dissenting opinion, issued in Ad-
ams v. Tanner 48 during his first term on the Court, he argued that the Court 
must consider the “evil” the State of Washington sought to remedy, the reme-
dy adopted, and the experience elsewhere, not to determine whether the reme-
dy was wise, or even to establish the facts since such matters were within the 
province of the state legislature.  “The sole purpose of the inquiries is to ena-
ble this Court to decide whether, in view of the facts, actual or possible, the 
action of the State of Washington was so clearly arbitrary or so unreasonable 
that it could not be taken” without violating fundamental rights.49
In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann50 he argued that the Court had no right 
to weigh the evidence or determine whether all statements of fact upon which 
Oklahoma’s legislature acted were well-founded but simply the far more 
modest task of determining the “reasonableness” of its belief in the existence 
of evils and the effectiveness of its remedy.51  The Court must defer to the su-
44. Walton H. Hamilton, The Jurist’s Art, in MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 169, 187 (Felix Frankfur-
ter ed., 1932). 
45. Epstein and her colleagues also report that Brandeis dissented in sixteen cases that were 
later overruled.  Epstein et al., Rating the Justices, supra note 6, at 22.
46. See, e.g., Jay Burns Baking v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 534 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); New State 
Ice v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
47. See, e.g., Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); New State Ice,
285 U.S. at 284–87, 302–03 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. 
Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Adams v. Tan-
ner, 244 U.S. 590, 600 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
48. 244 U.S. 590 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
49. Id. at 600. 
50. 285 U.S. 262.  
51. Id. at 286–87 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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perior authority of the state legislature to know the relevant facts.52  The fol-
lowing year in Liggett v. Lee53 Brandeis argued that a Florida statute was pre-
sumptively constitutional absent any factual showing that it was unreasona-
ble.54  Ultimately, in the mid-1930s, the Court began to display greater 
deference to legislative decision-making in economic matters, in cases like 
Nebbia v. New York55 and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.56
Brandeis had frequently dissented from opinions of the White and Taft 
Courts constraining union activity, including in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. 
Deering,57 and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters’ Ass’n.58
In United States v. Hutcheson, the Court held that Congress, in response to 
dissents by Brandeis, had clarified federal anti-trust law to exempt union ac-
tivity, thereby bringing the law into harmony with his interpretation.59
 Or take Brandeis’s classic dissent in Olmstead v. United States60 in which, 
in the context of the Fourth Amendment, he argued that the Constitution con-
ferred as against the government a right to privacy or, as he put it, “the right to 
be let alone.”  In one of the most memorable passages in Supreme Court opin-
ions, Brandeis wrote: 
     The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much 
broader in scope.  The makers of our Constitution undertook 
to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.  
They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of 
his feelings, and of his intellect.  They knew that only a part 
of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found 
in material things.  They sought to protect Americans in their 
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.  
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let 
52. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 121, 128 
(2010) (discussing Brandeis’s belief in legislative superiority for fact-finding regarding societal prob-
lems). 
53. 288 U.S. 517 (1933). 
54. Id. at 543 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Quaker City Cab Co. v. Commonwealth of Pa.,
277 U.S. 389, 411 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The Court may think such views unsound.  But, 
obviously, the requirement that a classification must be reasonable does not imply that the policy 
embodied in the classification made by the legislature of a State shall seem to this Court a wise 
one.”); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 533–34 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that Court’s role was not to weigh evidence but to determine whether legislative act “transcends 
the bounds of reason”). 
55. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
56. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
57. 254 U.S. 443, 479 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
58. 274 U.S. 37, 56 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
59. 312 U.S. 219, 229–31, 236 (1941). 
60. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). 
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alone—the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most 
valued by civilized men.  To protect that right, every unjusti-
fiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the 
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.61
Brandeis and his law partner, Samuel D. Warren, had first developed that 
concept nearly forty years earlier in their classic Harvard Law Review article,
“The Right to Privacy,” but they were writing about a common law right 
against unwanted publicity, not a constitutional right.62  In his Olmstead dis-
sent, Brandeis argued that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures was not limited to situations where the govern-
ment physically entered property, and looked for, and confiscated, objects as 
the Court, in a rather literal and formalistic opinion by Chief Justice Taft con-
cluded.63  Brandeis, however, reasoned that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
were produced in an age when force and violence were the means of compel-
ling evidence, but by 1928 technology offered new instruments like wiretap-
ping that allowed government surreptitiously to invade private spaces.64  Con-
stitutional interpretation, he said, must adapt to modern circumstance in order 
to vindicate the principle animating these texts in the Bill of Rights.65  He ar-
gued that the Fourth Amendment enjoined “every unjustifiable intrusion by 
the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em-
ployed.”66
In the end, it was Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent, not Taft’s majority opin-
ion, that endured, including his classic encomium of the constitutional concept 
of privacy.  Nearly forty years later, in Katz v. United States,67 the Court ex-
plicitly overruled Olmstead.  During the intervening years, other justices had 
found Brandeis’s dissent persuasive.  Dissenting in 1942 in Goldman v. Unit-
ed States, Justice Murphy cited Warren and Brandeis’s article of 1890 and re-
ferred to Brandeis’s “memorable dissent” in Olmstead as a text to which “lit-
tle can or need be added” regarding “the value of the right to privacy.”68  He 
followed Brandeis in recognizing “a right of personal privacy” in the Four-
61. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
62. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
63. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.  (“The Amendment does not forbid what was done here.  There
was no searching.  There was no seizure.  The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hear-
ing and that only.  There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.”). 
64. Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 472–74.
66. Id. at 478.
67. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
68. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 137 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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teenth Amendment which was “as dear as any to free men” and on which “the 
spiritual freedom of the individual depends in no small measure.”69  Chief Jus-
tice Stone and Justice Frankfurter also announced they were prepared to over-
turn Olmstead for reasons stated in its dissenting opinions.70  In 1947, dissent-
ing in Harris v. United States, Frankfurter, though not yet the full Court, 
would have explicitly overruled the Olmstead majority.71  In 1952, Justice 
Douglas, who had been in the majority in Goldman, was now convinced that 
he had been wrong and that Brandeis was right from the beginning.72  “I can-
not improve on [Brandeis’s dissent],” he wrote, and then proceeded to quote 
four paragraphs from it.73
The Court did not explicitly rely on Brandeis’s classic dissent when it 
gave Olmstead its overdue burial in Katz.74  Justice Stewart, who wrote the 
majority opinion, had earlier expressed hostility to a constitutional right to 
privacy in a different context75 and here specifically stated that “the Fourth 
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional ‘right to priva-
cy.’”76  Yet Brandeis’s dissent had left its mark during the prior four decades 
and in some respects Katz followed the path it suggested. Katz recognized 
that the Fourth Amendment protected people, not places, and that its protec-
tion did not depend upon a physical intrusion.77  The adoption of these princi-
ples allowed the Fourth Amendment to reach newer, potentially intrusive 
69. Id.
70. Id. at 136. 
71. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 159 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (associating 
the Fourth Amendment with the right to be let alone). 
72. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 762 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
73. Id. at 762–64.  Justice Douglas referred to Brandeis’s dissent as the “historic statement” of 
the right to be let alone.  In On Lee, Justice Frankfurter observed that since it was decided, “instead 
of going from strength to strength in combating crime, we have gone from inefficiency to inefficien-
cy, from corruption to corruption.  The moral insight of Mr. Justice Brandeis unerringly foresaw this 
inevitability.” Id. at 759; see also Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 146 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting) (describing Brandeis’s dissent as “prophetic” of situation presented). 
74. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Rediscovering
Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 643, 646 (2007) (claiming Katz adopted Brandeis’s 
approach); Carol S. Steiker, Brandeis in Olmstead: “Our Government is the Potent, the Omnipresent 
Teacher,” 79 MISS. L. REV. 149, 161 (2009) (calling Katz “a belated vindication” of Brandeis’s dis-
sent). But cf.  Paul A. Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, in PRIVACY 182, 197 n.20 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971) (stating tersely that in Katz “the dissenting position [in 
Olmstead] was adopted by the Court” if “the dissenting position” is read as meaning simply that the 
Fourth Amendment applied to warrantless electronic surveillance); Steiker, supra, at 158–63 (dis-
cussing differences between Katz and Brandeis dissent).
75. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“I can find 
no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in any 
case ever before decided by this Court.”). 
76. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350. 
77. Id. at 351. 
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technologies, which Brandeis had anticipated with alarm.78  And it protected 
privacy of the telephone upon which the user justifiably relied.
Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent had also provided a concept that influenced 
the shape of constitutional doctrine in other important ways beyond his antici-
pation.  In 1965, two years before Katz overruled Olmstead, the Court used a 
newly-minted constitutional right to privacy to strike down a Connecticut law 
prohibiting the use of contraceptives in Griswold v. Connecticut.79  The 
Court’s opinion, written by Justice Douglas, maintained that although the 
Constitution does not mention privacy, marital or otherwise, “penumbras” or 
“emanations” from a collection of constitutional clauses are sufficient to cre-
ate the right.80  Since Brandeis never wrote, in the U.S. Reports or law re-
views, about the application of a “right to be let alone” to sexual activity it is 
unclear how he would have regarded it.  Yet quite clearly his formulation 
helped shape the doctrine that emerged from his argument in Olmstead.
Four years before Griswold, the Court had dodged deciding the contracep-
tive issue.81  There, Justice Frankfurter’s plurality opinion invoked Brandeis’s 
“Ashwander Rules” to justify the Court’s practice of avoiding constitutional 
questions whenever possible.82  Justice Harlan, however, was not persuaded 
the Court should avoid the constitutional question.83  Rather, he drew at length 
from Brandeis in Olmstead, which he described as “[p]erhaps the most com-
prehensive statement of the principle of liberty underlying these aspects of the 
Constitution” dealing with the privacy of the home,84 as well as from Brande-
is’s dissent in Gilbert v. Minnesota celebrating “the privacy and freedom of 
the home.”85
In the years leading up to Griswold, Brandeis’s formulation had appeared 
without attribution;86 the Court had associated the Fourth Amendment with a 
right of privacy;87 and Brandeis’s classic passage in Olmstead had permeated 
academic writing.88  For instance, Erwin Griswold, Dean of Harvard Law 
78. See Steiker, supra note 74, at 158.
79. 381 U.S. 479.
80. Id. at 484.
81. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503 (1961).
82. Id. at 502–03.
83. Id. at 524 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 550.
85. Id. at 552 (quoting Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 335–36 (1920)).
86. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650–51, 654–56 (1961) (repeatedly referring to
Fourth Amendment as standing for “right of privacy”); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Under the Fourth Amendment, the judiciary has a special duty of protect-
ing the right of the people to be let alone, except as warrants issue on a showing of probable cause.”). 
87. See, e.g., Mapp, 367 U.S. at 650–52, 655–56 (1961).
88. See Erwin N. Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 NW. U. L. REV., 216, 216–17 (1960).
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School, wrote that the right to be let alone, “the most familiar statement” of 
which appeared in Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent, was “implicit in many of the 
provisions of the Constitution and in the philosophic background out of which 
the Constitution was formulated.”89  Princeton professor William Beaney in-
cluded a lengthy discussion of Brandeis in Olmstead in an article of 1962.90
Utah Law School Dean Daniel J. Dykstra discussed Brandeis’s formulation in 
“The Right Most Valued by Civilized Men.”91
Justice Black, dissenting in Griswold, recognized a Brandeisian back-
ground to Douglas’s opinion for the Court and, as it conflicted with his own 
constitutional formalism, did not like what he saw.92  The Court, he com-
plained, had converted the tort-based right that Warren and Brandeis had ar-
ticulated into a constitutional concept.93  Justice Goldberg in his concurrence 
which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan joined, explicitly relied on 
Brandeis’s dissent, quoting from it since it “comprehensively summarized the 
principles underlying the Constitution’s guarantees of privacy.”94
When the issue of abortion came to the Supreme Court eight years later in 
Roe v. Wade, some justices again turned to Brandeis for guidance.95  Justice 
Blackmun, who wrote the majority opinion for seven justices in the case, cited 
Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent as a source of the right to privacy.96  Concurring, 
Justice Douglas anchored Griswold’s right to privacy in the right to be let 
alone, which Brandeis celebrated in Olmstead.97  In dissent, Justice Rehnquist 
complained that the Court had abandoned its practice of not formulating a rule 
broader than the facts presented, and cited Brandeis’s Ashwander Rules in 
support.98
B. The Most Powerful Moral Teacher 
Yet just as Brandeis’s judicial legacy certainly does not depend on his ma-
jority opinions, neither does it turn primarily on the extent to which his dis-
sents and concurring opinions later became law.  Rather, his legacy rests on 
89. Id. at 216.
90. William M. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 212, 218–28. 
91. 6 UTAH L. REV. 305 (1959).
92. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 n.1 (Black, J., dissenting).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
95. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
96. Id. at 152.
97. Id. at 213 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“This right of privacy was called by Mr. Justice
Brandeis the right ‘to be let alone.’ Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (dissenting opin-
ion).”)
98. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 172 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the instructive way in which he expressed foundational constitutional ideals.  
The vocabulary in those formulations have provided future generations.  As 
Paul Freund wrote about the Justice: “The mission that he pursued indomita-
bly was no less than to rediscover the prophetic ideals that became historic 
American values, and to devise ways to translate these into the structure of 
our modern industrial society.”99  Not surprisingly, Brandeis expressed these 
ideals most powerfully in his concurring opinions and dissents.  
Although categorizing Brandeis’s thoughts risks oversimplification, his 
ideas might be usefully placed in five groups.  First, he was an eloquent pro-
ponent of individual rights.  Justice Frankfurter did not overstate the case 
when he referred to Brandeis as “co-architect of the great constitutional struc-
ture of civil liberties.”100  The discussion above of Olmstead suggests how 
Brandeis’s “right to be let alone” has influenced the Court’s formulation of 
the constitutional concept (or concepts) of privacy.101  Brandeis’s Olmstead 
dissent was one of the two great pillars of that structure. 
His concurring opinion in Whitney v. California102 was the other.  This 
case arose from the conviction of Anna Whitney for violating California’s 
syndicalism statute through her participation in the Industrial Workers of the 
World (IWW).103  Although Brandeis joined on procedural grounds104 the 
Court’s unanimous opinion affirming Whitney’s conviction, his ringing con-
currence reads like a dissent.105  Perhaps more eloquently than any other Su-
preme Court opinion, Brandeis’s concurrence articulated an enduring ra-
tionale for a robust doctrine of free political speech.  He wrote: 
     Those who won our independence believed that the final 
end of the State was to make men free to develop their facul-
ties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should 
99. Paul A. Freund, Brandeis, Louis Dembitz, in AMERICAN REFORMERS 107, 112 (Alden
Whitman ed., 1985). 
100.  Pennekamp v.  Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 352 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
101. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
102. 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
103. Id. at 359, 364 (majority opinion). 
104. Id. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  Whitney had not argued that the California law was 
unconstitutional absent clear and unusual danger of serious evil and had not asked judge or jury to 
consider those questions.  Moreover, there was evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could 
find that the IWW was part of a conspiracy to commit serious crimes. 
105. Brandeis’s opinion grew largely out of a dissent he wrote in Ruthenberg v. Michigan dur-
ing the Court’s 1926 term regarding the appeal of Charles E. Ruthenberg, executive secretary of the 
Communist Party of Michigan, for allegedly violating Michigan’s Criminal Syndicalism law.  The 
case was mooted by Ruthenberg’s death in March 1927 before the Court could affirm his conviction 
and accordingly Brandeis had no occasion to issue a dissent in that case.  Instead, he converted much 
of his work in that case for use in Whitney.  See Ronald K.L. Collins & David Skover, Curious Con-
currence: Justice Brandeis’s Vote in Whitney v. California, 2005 Sup. Ct. Rev. 333, 334. 
38800-m
qt_100-2 Sheet No. 95 Side A      02/22/2017   09:25:38
38800-mqt_100-2 Sheet No. 95 Side A      02/22/2017   09:25:38
C M
Y K
GOLDSTEIN_MILLER-P.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/17 11:38 AM
2016] BRANDEIS: THE LEGACY OF A JUSTICE 475 
prevail over the arbitrary.  They valued liberty both as an end 
and as a means.  They believed liberty to be the secret of hap-
piness and courage to be the secret of liberty.  They believed 
that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think 
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of politi-
cal truth; that, without free speech and assembly discussion 
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily 
adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doc-
trine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; 
that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should 
be a fundamental principle of the American government.  
They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are 
subject.  But they knew that order cannot be secured merely 
through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazard-
ous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear 
breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate men-
aces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the op-
portunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed 
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good 
ones.  Believing in the power of reason as applied through 
public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the 
argument of force in its worst form.  Recognizing the occa-
sional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the 
Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guar-
anteed.
     Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of 
free speech and assembly.  Men feared witches and burnt 
women.  It is the function of speech to free men from the 
bondage of irrational fears.106
Brandeis proceeded to define the prevailing “clear and present danger” 
test by giving each adjective and noun a constrained reading.107  Under 
Brandeis’s formulation, the evil anticipated must be serious, imminent and 
likely to result absent suppression of speech.  An emergency must be so se-
vere and imminent as to preclude further discussion and make action a neces-
sary last resort.108
106. Id. at 375–76.  The phrase “they believed liberty to be the secret of happiness, and courage 
to be the secret of liberty” came from Pericles’ “Funeral Oration.”  Presumably Brandeis expected 
his readers to recognize it, but few of today’s readers will.  For a fuller discussion, see CHARLES A.
MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 98–99 (1969). 
107. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376. 
108. Id. at 377 (“Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards.  They did 
not fear political change.  They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty.  To courageous, self-reliant 
men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of 
popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the in-
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Alexander Bickel later called Brandeis’s Whitney opinion “one of the 
most eloquent, as well as intellectually persuasive, passages in the extensive 
literature of free speech.”109  Brandeis’s biographer, Melvin Urofsky, suggest-
ed that Whitney “[p]erhaps more than any other of his opinions . . . has shaped 
American constitutional law,” citing its influence on the First Amendment ju-
risprudence of Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and John Marshall Harlan 
II.110  He might have added Justice Stevens to his list, who later called
Brandeis’s Whitney concurrence “the most significant” opinion of the Taft 
Court.111
Urofsky was surely right when he wrote that if Brandeis “had never writ-
ten anything other than the Olmstead and Whitney opinions his impact on 
American constitutional law would still have been great.”112  Yet Brandeis’s 
often lonely commitment to individual rights was also evident in cases be-
yond Olmstead and Whitney.  In fact, his Whitney opinion was the culmination 
of nearly a decade’s thought and writing regarding free expression.  In his 
1920 opinion in Schaefer v. United States, he cautioned against prosecuting 
someone “for a disloyal heart” and worried that even in peacetime “an intoler-
ant majority, swayed by passion or by fear, may be prone in the future, as it 
has often been in the past, to stamp as disloyal opinions with which it disa-
grees.”113  Later in 1920, Brandeis dissented from a case affirming a convic-
tion for teaching pacifism in violation of a Minnesota law.114  In his dissent, 
he argued that the law punished not acts but beliefs, particularly one section 
that he wrote made 
it punishable to teach in any place a single person that a citi-
zen should not aid in carrying on a war, no matter what the 
relation of the parties may be.  Thus the statute invades the 
privacy and freedom of the home.  Father and mother may not 
cidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full 
discussion.  If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil 
by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.  Only 
an emergency can justify repression.”). 
109. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT 
THE BAR OF POLITICS 99 (1962).
110. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 36, at 638.
111. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 31 (2011); see also 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (Stevens, J., for six-justice majority, referring to “Jus-
tice Brandeis’s classic opinion in Whitney”); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 
(1964) (Brennan, J., for six-justice majority, referring to Brandeis’s “classic formulation” in Whit-
ney).
112. UROFSKY, supra note 36, at 618. 
113. Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 493, 495 (1920) (Brandeis, J., concurring and 
dissenting); see also Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
114. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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follow the promptings of religious belief, of conscience or of 
conviction, and teach son or daughter the doctrine of paci-
fism.115
 In dissenting from a decision which allowed the postmaster general to de-
ny a preferred mailing rate to a publication which he thought had included 
subversive materials, Brandeis wrote:  
If, under the Constitution, administrative officers may, as a 
mere incident of the peace time administration of their de-
partments, be vested with the power to issue such orders as 
this, there is little of substance in our Bill of Rights and in 
every extension of governmental functions lurks a new dan-
ger to civil liberty.116
A second aspect of Brandeis’s thought was his belief that citizenship im-
posed upon the individual duties that could be more important than rights. 
“[A]bove all rights rises duty to the community,” he declared in his dissent in 
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering.117  In a case of 1922 testing whether a 
state law could prevent coal mining that caused the subsidence of a house, a 
Court majority in an opinion by Justice Holmes held that it could not, while 
Brandeis in dissent spoke of the “paramount rights” of the public under the 
state law because the regulated party enjoyed “the advantage of living and do-
ing business in a civilized community.”118
Third, Brandeis worried about “bigness,” both economic and governmen-
tal.  Regarding the former, Brandeis had written about the “curse of bigness” 
during his years as a public-spirited citizen119 and he did not abandon those 
convictions when he joined the Court.  One week before he issued his dissent 
in Olmstead, he gave voice to some of these concerns in dissenting in Quaker
City Cab Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 120 that struck down a state 
measure taxing corporations more heavily than individuals.  He wrote: 
But there are still intelligent, informed, just-minded, and civi-
lized persons who believe that the rapidly growing aggrega-
tion of capital through corporations constitutes an insidious 
menace to the liberty of the citizen; that it tends to increase 
the subjection of labor to capital; that, because of the guid-
115. Id. at 335–36. 
116. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 436 (1921) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting).
117.  Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
118. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
119. See, e.g., THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS
(Osmond  K. Fraenkel ed., 1934). 
120. 277 U.S. 389 (1928). 
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ance and control necessarily exercised by great corporations 
upon those engaged in business, individual initiative is being 
impaired and creative power will be lessened; that the absorp-
tion of capital by corporations, and their perpetual life, may 
bring evils similar to those which attended mortmain; that the 
evils incident to the accelerating absorption of business by 
corporations outweigh the benefits thereby secured, and that 
the process of absorption should be retarded.121
Five years later, amidst the Great Depression, Louis K. Liggett Co. v. 
Lee122 furnished another opportunity for Brandeis to echo, and build upon, his 
earlier expression while dissenting from the Court’s decision striking down a 
Florida statute that imposed heavier taxes on corporations operating chain 
stores than on others.  He wrote: 
     There is a widespread belief that the existing unemploy-
ment is the result, in large part, of the gross inequality in the 
distribution of wealth and income which giant corporations 
have fostered; that, by the control which the few have exerted 
through giant corporations, individual initiative and effort are 
being paralyzed, creative power impaired, and human happi-
ness lessened; that the true prosperity of our past came not 
from big business, but through the courage, the energy, and 
the resourcefulness of small men; that only by releasing from 
corporate control the faculties of the unknown many, only by 
reopening to them the opportunities for leadership, can confi-
dence in our future be restored and the existing misery be 
overcome, and that only through participation by the many in 
the responsibilities and determinations of business can Amer-
icans secure the moral and intellectual development which is 
essential to the maintenance of liberty.  If the citizens of Flor-
ida share that belief, I know of nothing in the Federal Consti-
tution which precludes the State from endeavoring to give it 
effect and prevent domination in intrastate commerce by sub-
jecting corporate chains to discriminatory license fees.  To 
that extent, the citizens of each State are still masters of their 
destiny.123
Brandeis also warned against the inappropriate exercise of governmental 
121. Id. at 410–11 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
122. 288 U.S. 517 (1933). 
123. Id. at 580 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Freund, Justice Brandeis: A Law Clerk’s Re-
membrance, supra note 8, at 13 (Liggett “became in his hands a vehicle for the expression of his pro-
foundest convictions about the vices of bigness.  He poured into his opinions the fruits of a lifetime 
of experience and study, with a freedom made possible by the fact that he was writing for himself 
alone.”).
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power.  That concern found consistent expression in cases involving separa-
tion of powers, federalism, and constitutional rights.  Brandeis appreciated the 
Constitution’s separation of powers as a strategy to restrain government.  As 
he wrote in a dissent in 1926: 
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the 
Convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency, but to preclude 
the exercise of arbitrary power.  The purpose was, not to 
avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction inci-
dent to the distribution of the governmental powers among 
three departments, to save the people from autocracy.124
Yet Brandeis did not rely simply on institutional arrangements to hold 
government to a high standard of behavior.  In 1921, he dissented from a 
Court decision allowing the government to retain for use in criminal proceed-
ings documents that private parties had stolen and then furnished.125  Brandeis 
acknowledged as true the majority’s argument that “no provision of the Con-
stitution requires their surrender and that the papers could have been subpoe-
naed.”126  Yet he regarded that contention as irrelevant. 
Still I cannot believe that action of a public official is neces-
sarily lawful, because it does not violate constitutional prohi-
bitions and because the same result might have been attained 
by other and proper means.  At the foundation of our civil 
liberty lies the principle which denies to government officials 
an exceptional position before the law and which subjects 
them to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the 
citizen.127
Seven years later, Brandeis expressed similar inclinations in dissenting 
from a majority opinion by Justice Holmes upholding the conviction of a law-
yer for violating federal narcotics laws that prohibited the purchase of mor-
phine not in or from its original package.128  Prison officials had conspired to 
entrap a lawyer suspected of providing morphine to prisoners and had suc-
ceeded in their scheme.129  The evidence convinced Brandeis that officials had 
no prior basis to believe the defendant had violated the law.130  Brandeis ar-
124.  Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
125.  Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 476 (1921); see id. for Brandeis’s succinct and ele-
gant statement of the facts and question presented (“Plaintiff’s private papers were stolen.  The thief, 
to further his own ends, delivered them to the law officer of the United States.  He, knowing them to 
have been stolen, retains them for use against the plaintiff.  Should the court permit him to do so?”). 
126. Id. at 477. 
127.  Id.
128. Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 421 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
129. Id. at 421–22. 
130. Id. at 424. 
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gued that the conviction should be vacated, not to vindicate any right the de-
fendant possessed but rather “to protect the government.  To protect it from 
illegal conduct of its officers. To preserve the purity of its courts.”131
Brandeis wrote his most enduring exposition of the perils of government 
misconduct two months later in his dissent in Olmstead.132  There he cau-
tioned that the danger of a violation of constitutional rights was greatest when 
government pursued popular ends: 
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect 
liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent.  Men 
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their 
liberty by evil-minded rulers.  The greatest dangers to liberty 
lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning 
but without understanding.133
Brandeis argued that, independent of constitutional arguments relating to 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the Court should reverse the conviction on 
equitable grounds.  The wire-tapping when committed had represented simply 
the illegal acts of government officials, but “if this Court should permit the 
Government, by means of its officers’ crimes, to effect its purpose of punish-
ing the defendants, there would seem to be present all the elements of a ratifi-
cation” and “the Government itself would become a lawbreaker.”134  The 
Court should protect itself by invoking the defense of unclean hands against 
the government.135
Yet Brandeis’s concern went beyond his belief that the rule of law bound 
government officials as well as private citizens.  Brandeis added to the con-
cerns previously expressed when he wrote that because the government was 
the “omnipresent teacher,” it had additional reason to make certain its behav-
ior conformed to a high standard.  He wrote: 
     Decency, security and liberty alike demand that govern-
ment officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct 
that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, 
existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to 
observe the law scrupulously.  Our Government is the potent, 
the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the 
whole people by its example.  Crime is contagious.  If the 
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for 
131. Id. at 425. 
132. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
133. Id. at 479.  It may be noted that the last sentence in this passage is inscribed on the wall of 
a corridor in the House wing of the U.S. Capitol. 
134. Id. at 483. 
135. Id. at 485. 
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law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it in-
vites anarchy.  To declare that, in the administration of the 
criminal law, the end justifies the means—to declare that the 
Government may commit crimes in order to secure the con-
viction of a private criminal—would bring terrible retribution.
Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely 
set its face.136
Yet Brandeis knew that separated powers and checks and balances did not 
eliminate the need for governmental institutions, including the judiciary, to 
exercise self-restraint.  He had resisted the use of the Due Process clauses to 
strike down economic regulations of legislative bodies, arguing that in a de-
mocracy courts should generally defer to those political judgments.137  His 
dissent in International News Service v. Associated Press138 written near the 
beginning of his tenure articulated his recognition of the limits of judicial ca-
pacity as an additional reason for deference.  He agreed that Associated Press 
had some property right in the news its reporters collected during World War 
I and which INS had pirated and sold at a lower price.139  The “injustice” 
of INS’s behavior was “obvious,” he said, but injustice in the setting of the 
case was not sufficient to support a decision for the Associated Press.140
“Courts,” he wrote, “are ill-equipped to make the investigations which should 
precede a determination of the limitations which should be set upon any prop-
erty right in  news.”141  Courts, he continued, “would be powerless to pre-
scribe the [needed] detailed regulations . . . .”142  Rather, courts should not 
promulgate a new rule at all, but should leave to Congress the task of investi-
gating and legislating with respect to the injustice the case brought to light.143
Brandeis did not address whether it was realistic to expect Congress to under-
take the assignment.  But he presumably believed that in this instance leaving 
a wrong without a remedy was preferable to fashioning a judicial rule when 
prudential considerations dictated inviting legislative attention and waiting for 
Congress to act.144
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257-258 
(1931); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 283-285, 310 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
138. 248 U.S. 215, 248 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
139. Id. at 262. 
140. Id.
141. Id. at 267. 
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. For discussions of International News Service v. Associated Press, see UROFSKY, LOUIS
D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE, supra note 36, at 551–52; Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. 
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The most cited of Brandeis’s opinions is his concurrence in Ashwander v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority.145  The opinion, which brought together years of 
experience and thought about the role of the Supreme Court, provides guide-
lines for judicial action or inaction.  He articulated the rules against deciding 
questions outside of an adversarial context;146 anticipating constitutional ques-
tions;147 formulating constitutional rules broader than the facts require;148 de-
ciding cases on a constitutional basis when an alternative ground is availa-
ble;149 adjudicating matters brought by those without standing;150 adjudicating 
claims brought by those who have benefitted from the laws they are challeng-
ing;151 considering a constitutional challenge to a statute where it can fairly be 
construed in a manner to sustain it;152 and striking down a statute absent its 
clear unconstitutionality.153
Finally, notwithstanding his concern regarding the burdens on the people 
of governmental power, Brandeis also believed that government had an essen-
tial regulatory function.  As he concluded in his dissent in Duplex Printing 
Press v. Deering:
All rights are derived from the purposes of the society in 
which they exist; above all rights rises duty to the communi-
ty.  The conditions developed in industry may be such that 
those engaged in it cannot continue their struggle without 
danger to the community.  But it is not for judges to deter-
mine whether such conditions exist, nor is it their function to 
Associated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85, 93
(1992).
145. 297 U.S. 288 (1936). 
146. Id. at 346 (“The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, 
non-adversary, proceeding, declining because to decide such questions is ‘legitimate only in the last 
resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individu-
als.’”).
147. Id. at 346–47 (“The Court will not ‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance 
of the necessity of deciding it.’”). 
148. Id. at 347 (“The Court will not ‘formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is re-
quired by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.’”). 
149. Id. (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question, although properly presented 
by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”). 
150. Id. (“The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who 
fails to show that he is injured by its operation.”). 
151. Id. at 348 (“The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance 
of one who has availed himself of its benefits.”). 
152. Id. (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a seri-
ous doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain 
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”). 
153. Id. at 354–56 (referring to “the long established presumption in favor of the constitutional-
ity of a statute” and citing statements against findings of unconstitutionality except in clear cases). 
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set the limits of permissible contest and to declare the duties 
which the new situation demands.  This is the function of the 
legislature which, while limiting individual and group rights 
of aggression and defense, may substitute processes of justice 
for the more primitive method of trial by combat.154
Thus, rights, even those Brandeis most cherished, must sometimes yield to 
government’s proper regulatory function.  As he wrote in his Olmstead dis-
sent, the “right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right 
most valued by civilized men,” was not an absolute, because the Fourth 
Amendment did not prohibit every governmental intrusion into individual pri-
vacy but only “every unjustifiable intrusion.”155  So, too, the rights of free 
speech and assembly, which he recognized as basic to political society in 
his Whitney concurrence, must sometimes yield since they were “fundamen-
tal, [but] not in their nature absolute.”156  Instead, “[t]heir exercise is subject to 
restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect 
the State from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic, or mor-
al.”157
Brandeis accepted government regulation, not simply to avert harm, how-
ever, but out of a sense of optimism regarding the virtue of experimentation as 
an engine of progress.  “There must be power in the States and the nation to 
remould, through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to 
meet changing social and economic needs,” he wrote in his New State Ice v. 
Liebmann dissent in 1932.158  And although his formulation imagined experi-
mentation at both levels of a federal government, experimenting at the state 
level offered a special advantage: “It is one of the happy incidents of the fed-
eral system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as 
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country.”159  Decades later Justice Harlan referred to Brandeis’s 
“laboratory” metaphor as a “celebrated dictum.”160  Brandeis’s commitment to 
154. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 488 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
155. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
156. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
157. Id. See also Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937) 
(balancing the constitutional right of union members to publicize “the facts of a labor dispute” and 
the state’s police power to “regulate the methods and means of publicity as well as the use of public 
streets”).
158. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
159. Id.
160. Duncan v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 193 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see al-
so Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 752 (1964) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting) (stating that the point regarding “the unique values” of states in the federal union “was never 
better made” than by Brandeis in his “classic dissent” in Liebmann).
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federalism, as a means of promoting experimentation and decentralizing gov-
ernmental power, was also reflected in his Erie opinion which was decided at 
the time the Court was adopting a broader understanding of Congress’s power 
under the Commerce Clause.  As Bruce Ackerman observed, “just at the mo-
ment that the New Deal Court was destroying the old notion that Congress 
had limited powers over the economy, Brandeis was creating a new—if more 
modest—constitutional role for states’ rights in the courts.”161
Brandeis’s dissent in New State Ice contains some of his most stirring 
writing, most notably his final sentence: “If we would guide by the light of 
reason, we must let our minds be bold.”162  But a reader is bound to juxtapose 
that uplifting message with a line earlier in the opinion: “Man is weak, and his 
judgment is, at best, fallible.”163  Yet the two views do not cancel one another 
out, and it is very possible to admire both Brandeises.  Indeed, the different 
judgments reflected the complexity of Brandeis’s judgments and his recogni-
tion that the law, like life, often had to accommodate seemingly inconsistent 
beliefs.
Brandeis’s belief in experimentation also informed his understanding of 
stare decisis.164  Courts should generally follow precedent in order to lend 
consistency and predictability to law.165  But stare decisis was not an “inexo-
rable command.”166  Courts must be willing to overturn constitutional deci-
sions which otherwise resisted correction “to bring its opinions into agreement 
with experience and with facts newly ascertained.”167
C. Brandeis’s Students: Later Justices 
Brandeis’s formulations have continued to percolate through the U.S. Re-
ports in the seventy-seven years since he left the Court.  It is a particularly ra-
161. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 372 (1998). 
162. 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Jay Burns Baking v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 
504, 517, 520 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Sometimes, if we would guide by the light of reason, we 
must let our minds be bold.”).
163. New State Ice, 285 U.S. at 310. 
164. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407–08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate 
also in the judicial function”). 
165. Id. at 405–06. 
166. Id. at 405.
167. Id. at 412; see also Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (“But the doctrine of stare decisis does not command that we err again when we have occa-
sion to pass upon a different statute.  In the search for truth through the slow process of inclusion and 
exclusion, involving trial and error, it behooves us to reject, as guides, the decisions upon such ques-
tions which prove to have been mistaken.”); Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action.  But it is not a universal, 
inexorable command.”). 
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re tribute that Brandeis’s successors have continued to look to his concurrenc-
es and dissents.  Justices cite majority opinions because they reflect prevailing 
law.  Concurrences and dissents can claim no such authority.  Their use signi-
fies an appreciation of the ideas expressed and a perception that they are like-
ly to be persuasive either because of the high regard in which Brandeis is held 
or because of the ideas themselves.  
The frequency with which the Court or its justices have invoked Brande-
is’s concurrences or dissents since his retirement provides one telling measure 
of his continuing influence.  Since his retirement in February, 1939 Supreme 
Court opinions have cited forty-seven Brandeis concurrences or dissents.  Ta-
ble 1 shows the ten most cited Brandeis discretionary opinions. 
Table 1 Number of Opinions Citing a Brandeis Concurrence or Dissent 
Since 1939168
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority (1936) 183
Olmstead v. United States (1928) 98
Whitney v. California (1927) 97
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. (1932) 66
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (1932)  50
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering (1921)  15
Myers v. United States (1926)  14
Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service 
Commission of Missouri (1923) 
12
United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democrat  Publishing Co. v. 
Burleson (1921) 
12
Crowell v. Benson (1932) 11
Ashwander is cited nearly twice as many times as the next nearest 
case.  This should hardly be a surprise.  Ashwander provides guidelines or 
“rules” that Brandeis propounded for the federal judiciary.169  The quality of 
the opinion and the authority of the author give it the aura of a vade mecum,
waiting to be consulted by any conscientious justice. 
The next two most cited opinions are the familiar pair of Brande-
is’s Whitney concurrence and Olmstead dissent.  They are cited for their ring-
ing rhetoric on behalf of freedom of expression and a right to be let 
168. The data in this Table relies on research performed over several years by Stacey Osmond, 
Zachary Merkle, Alex Davis, and most recently Jordan Buchheit.  The Table and related numbers on 
the following pages are updated to include cases decided through the end of the Supreme Court’s 
October 2015 term. (unpublished excel sheets and summary charts) (on file with author).
169. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. at 346–48 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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alone.170  The next case is Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., in which the 
Justice wrote a disquisition on stare decisis, a doctrine that in some cases in a 
legal system based as much on precedent as is the American, is inevitably 
controversial.171  After these cases comes Brandeis’s dissent in New State 
Ice, an opinion that combines the Justice’s arguments on behalf of a state’s 
right to experiment in its legislation affecting the economy and its fortunate 
position as a “laboratory,” with its closing credo: “If we would guide by the 
light of reason we must let our minds be bold.”172  A wide discrepancy in 
number of citations separates New State Ice from the others. 
These numbers become even more impressive when compared to citations 
of the prominent concurrences or dissents of other justices.  Justice Harlan’s 
famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), Justice Holmes’s in Lochner v. 
New York (1905), and Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown v. Sawyer
(1952) have been cited 32, 43 and 44 times in opinions by other Supreme 
Court justices respectively, less often than the top five of Brandeis’s concur-
rences or dissents.  Only Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United 
States (1919) with 57 citations would crack Brandeis’s first five. 
 The extent of Brandeis’s continuing influence on the Court is further sug-
gested by the number of justices who have looked to his opinions for guid-
ance. During the last seventy-seven years, 34 of the 42 justices who have 
served on the Court since Brandeis retired have cited at least one of his con-
currences or dissents.  The ten justices who cited Brandeis most often were 
Justices Stevens (79), Frankfurter (65), Brennan (62), Rehnquist (42), Mar-
shall (39), Douglas (37), Breyer (32), Harlan (24), O’Connor (23), and Powell 
(23), a list that includes jurists of varying ideologies and dispositions.  Half of 
the justices (21) have cited Brandeis’s discretionary opinions at least ten 
times.  There is no indication that Justice Brandeis’s influence is wan-
ing.  Since 2000, 12 of the 13 justices have cited thirteen Brandeis concur-
rences or dissents ninety-seven times.173  During that period, ten justic-
es174 have cited Brandeis’s Ashwander opinion more than thirty times.  
 Testimonials by many of Brandeis’s successors provide further evidence 
of his influence.  Justice Stevens, who held the Brandeis seat for nearly thirty-
five years, referred to Brandeis as a “hero” and “one of America’s greatest 
170. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478–79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Whit-
ney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see MILLER, supra note
106, at 97–99. 
171. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
172. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
173. (Unpublished excel sheets and summary chart) (on file with authors). 
174. Chief Justice Roberts (4) and Justices Stevens (6), Scalia (4), Kennedy (3), Souter (1), 
Thomas (3), Ginsburg (1), Breyer (10), Alito (1), and Kagan (1). 
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judges.”175  Justice Breyer called Brandeis a “legal seer” and praised his “im-
partiality, wisdom, and judicial depth.”176
What is striking is not simply how often Brandeis’s concurring and dis-
senting opinions are cited, but that they are invoked in many of the most sem-
inal constitutional law decisions since his time.  For instance, in Dennis v. 
United States177 four opinions representing the views of seven justices cited 
Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney178 as well as several other of his discre-
tionary opinions.179  In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., v. Sawyer,180 a leading 
case on presidential power growing out of President Truman’s order to seize 
America’s steel mills, Justices Frankfurter and Douglas in their concurrences 
cited Brandeis’s dissent in Myers181 and Frankfurter invoked Brandeis’s 
Ashwander opinion.182 In Mapp v. Ohio183 and Miranda v. Arizona184 the 
Court quoted Brandeis’s warning in Olmstead about the cost of government 
law-breaking in justifying the exclusion of evidence under the Fourth 
Amendment185 and the Fifth Amendment,186 respectively.  In New York Times 
v. Sullivan187 Justice Brennan, in his majority opinion, cited Brandeis’s “clas-
175. STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS, supra note 111, at 5.  Justice Brandeis’s influence on Justice Ste-
vens was reinforced by the fact that the latter’s revered constitutional law professor, Nathaniel Na-
thanson, had clerked for Justice Brandeis. Id.
176. Stephen Breyer, Assoc. J, U.S., Speech at Brandeis School of Law, Louisville, Ky.: Jus-
tice Brandeis as Legal Seer (Feb. 16, 2004) (available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_02-16-04 [https://perma.cc/Z8N9-
BWK5]).
177. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).  
178. Id. at 506–07 (Vinson, C.J., plurality opinion for himself, Reed, Burton, and Minton, J.); 
id. at 537 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 568 n.12 (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 585 (Douglas, 
J., dissenting). 
179. Id. at 526 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing Jay Burns Baking v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 
517); id. at 535 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing Schaefer and Pierce and Holmes’s dissent in
Abrams v. United States, which Brandeis joined); id. at 567–68, 571 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing
Whitney and Schaefer). Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); 
Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 493, 495 (1920); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253 
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
180. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
181. Id. at 613–14 (Frankfurter, J.., concurring); id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring); cf. also 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 702 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting (citing Brandeis’s Myers dissent simply to 
record, not to rely on, Brandeis’s opinion). Myers Adm’x v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)). 
182. Id. at 595; see also id. at 632 n.2 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Brandeis’s majority 
opinion in United States v. North American Transportation & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330, 333 
(1920)).
183. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
184. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
185. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659. 
186. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479–80. 
187. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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sic formulation” regarding free expression.188  In Stanley v. Georgia189 the 
Court drew from Brandeis’s Olmstead and Whitney opinions in striking down 
a Georgia statute that outlawed possession of obscenity.190  When, in 2001, 
the Court considered whether the First Amendment precluded prosecution for 
broadcasting a phone conversation that had been improperly intercepted, the 
Court looked to Brandeis for guidance regarding the constitutional principles 
regarding public discussion and privacy that were at stake.191  Justice Ste-
vens’s majority opinion cited the 1890 Warren and Brandeis article as well as 
the “classic opinion” in Whitney.192 Justice Breyer’s concurrence cited 
Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent for the “right to be let alone” as well as the earli-
er law review article193 that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent also invoked.194
More recently, multiple Brandeis discretionary opinions were cited in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission,195 the controversial campaign finance 
decision, and in McDonald v. Chicago,196 the case holding that the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms applied as against the states.  These cases illus-
trate a not infrequent phenomenon in which justices on opposing sides of a 
case each seek to associate the result they have reached with Brandeis’s teach-
ings.197
D. Brandeis’s Students: Presidents of the United States 
Yet even the Court’s continued reliance on the rich corpus of ideas Justice 
Brandeis left behind understates his judicial legacy.  The ideas he articulated 
188. Id. at 270; see also id. at 301 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing Brandeis’s Whitney con-
currence for the proposition that repression causes hatred). 
189. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
190. Id. at 564, 566–67. 
191. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001). 
192. Id. at 534–35 (2001). 
193. Id. at 536–38, 540 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
194. Id. at 553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
195. 558 U.S. 310, 395, 427, 466 (2010) (Chief Justice Roberts, concurring, citing Brandeis’s 
Ashwander concurrence while Justice Stevens, in the principal dissent, cited Brandeis’s opinions in 
Ashwander at 395, Liggett at 427, and Whitney at 466). 
196. 561 U.S. 742, 863, 865, 869, 921, 926 (2010) (Justices Stevens and Breyer each citing 
Brandeis’s opinions in Whitney and Liebmann in their dissents). 
197. See also  Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716–17, 751, 788 (2000) (the majority, associat-
ing the right of an unwilling listener to be free from unwanted communications to the right to be let 
alone, whereas Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that the right to be let alone applied to government, 
not private speech and Justice Kennedy, arguing that Whitney, not Olmstead, provided the principle 
that was relevant to speech); Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660–61 (majority opin-
ion); Boy Scouts at 664, 700 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Stevens, in dissent, writing for 
himself and three other justices, invoked Brandeis’s “laboratory” of democracy metaphor while the 
majority invoked Brandeis’s concurrence about free speech in Whitney and argued that his dissent 
in Liebmann applied to economic matters.). 
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on the bench have resonated in public discourse.  Presidents from both parties 
have frequently borrowed from Justice Brandeis’s prose to advance their own 
proposals. 
In his 1967 State of the Union Address, President Lyndon B. Johnson in-
voked “what Justice Brandeis called the ‘right most valued by civilized 
men’—the right to privacy” in calling for an end to wiretapping except in cas-
es of national security.198  President Richard M. Nixon, who described 
Brandeis as one of his “heroes”199 and called him a great jurist on multiple oc-
casions,200 also closed a national radio address on the American right of priva-
cy by stating that “in the first half of this century, Mr. Justice Brandeis called 
privacy the ‘right most valued by civilized men.’  In the last half of this centu-
ry, we must also make it the right that is most protected.”201  President Gerald 
Ford called Brandeis “one of the wisest” justices in American history.202
President Carter began a statement announcing new measures to protect pri-
vacy by quoting Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent.203  President Reagan, who re-
ferred to Brandeis as one of the “great [American] jurists”204 drew from him 
in warning against the dangers of centralized government.  He told the Ameri-
can Bar Association in 1983: “I think Justice Brandeis was right when he said, 
‘Experience teaches us to be most on our guard in protecting liberty when 
Government’s purposes are beneficent.’”205  President George H. W. Bush in-
198. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 2, 6 (Jan. 10, 
1967); see also Special Message to the Congress on Crime in America, 1 PUB. PAPERS 134, 144 (Feb.
6, 1967) (same); Remarks at the Swearing In of Ramsey Clark as Attorney General, 1 PUB. PAPERS
312, 313 (Mar. 10, 1967) (same). 
199. Remarks at a Question-and-Answer Session With a 10-Member Panel of the Economic 
Club of Detroit. PUB. PAPERS 965, 976 (Sept. 23, 1971).
200. Id.; Remarks at an Informal Meeting With Members of the White House Press Corps on 
Judge Haynsworth’s Nomination to the Supreme Court PUB. PAPERS 814, 819 (Oct. 20, 1969); Con-
versation with Newsmen on the Nomination of the Chief Justice of the United States, PUB. PAPERS
389, 397 (May 22, 1969). 
201. Radio Address About the American Right of Privacy, PUB. PAPERS 195, 198–99 (Feb. 23, 
1974).
202. Remarks at the Boy Scouts Annual Awards Dinner, PUB. PAPERS 691, 692 (Dec. 2, 1974). 
203. National Privacy Policy Message to the Congress on Proposals To Protect the Privacy of 
Individuals. PUB. PAPERS 581 (Apr. 2, 1979).
204. Statement on the American Bar Association’s Rating of Supreme Court Nominee Robert 
H. Bork, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1008 (Sept. 9, 1987); see also Remarks at a White House Briefing on the 
Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
PUB. PAPERS 1103, 1104 (Sept. 30, 1987) (describing Brandeis as “great” and “legendary”). 
205.  Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association in Atlanta, Georgia, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 1110, 1114 (Aug. 1, 1983); see also Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the National 
Association of Towns and Townships, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1252, 1253–54 (Sept. 12, 1983) (“The idealis-
tic goals of those who centralized American government didn’t change the nature of what we con-
fronted.  Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis once said that ‘Men born to freedom are naturally 
alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.  The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in 
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voked “[t]he great Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis” who “foresaw a 
time when a single courageous State may serve as a laboratory and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try.”206  At a state dinner for the President of Chile, the first President Bush 
recalled that Brandeis “observed that the final end of the state was to make 
men free to develop their faculties.  And he added that ‘Those who love free-
dom know liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of 
liberty.’”207  Like Jimmy Carter, President Clinton invoked Brandeis on priva-
cy from the Olmstead dissent.208  In vetoing a measure that would make unau-
thorized disclosures of classified information a felony, Clinton relied 
on Whitney:
     Justice Brandeis reminded us that “those who won our in-
dependence believed . . . that public discussion is a political 
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the 
American government.”  His words caution that we must al-
ways tread carefully when considering measures that may 
limit public discussion—even when those measures are in-
tended to achieve laudable, indeed necessary, goals. 209
Within the first ten days of his presidency, Barack Obama twice cited 
Brandeis in advocating governmental transparency.210  On other occasions, 
Obama invoked Brandeis for the virtues of federalism211 and the importance 
of citizenship.212
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.’”). 
206. Remarks at the Republican Governors’ Association Annual Dinner, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1349,
1351 (Oct. 17, 1989); see also Remarks at a Republican Party Fundraising Dinner in Los Angeles, 
California, 1 PUB. PAPERS 168, 169 (Feb. 6, 1990) (invoking “laboratories of democracy” metaphor).
207. Remarks at the State Dinner for President Patricio Aylwin of Chile, 1 PUB. PAPERS 766
(May 13, 1992).
208. Remarks Announcing the Financial Privacy and Consumer Protection Initiative, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 682, 683 (May 4, 1999); Remarks on the Issuance of Final Regulations on Protection of 
Medical Records Privacy, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2750, 2751 (Dec. 20, 2000). 
209. Message on Returning Without Approval to the House of Representatives Intelligence 
Authorization Legislation for Fiscal Year 2001, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2466 (Nov. 4, 2000). 
210. Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act, PUB. PAPERS (Jan. 21, 2009) (quoting 
Brandeis that sunlight is one of the best disinfectants); Remarks Following a Meeting With Business 
Leaders, PUB. PAPERS (Jan. 28, 2009) (same); see also The President’s Weekly Address May 1, 
2010, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-obama-calls-
congress-enact-reforms-stop-a-potential-corpor [https://perma.cc/HYW5-4RF5] (same). 
211. See also Memorandum on Preemption, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (May 20, 2009), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=86191 [https://perma.cc/9GU8-QRF9] (quoting Brandeis
that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country”). 
212. Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Fundraiser in Portland, Oregon,
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (May 7, 2015), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=110154 
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IV. JUSTICE BRANDEIS’S MODEL OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
Even the voluminous evidence presented above does not fully capture the 
legacy of Justice Brandeis’s twenty-three years on the Court.  Although much 
of what he left behind was compelling articulations of foundational ideals, his 
legacy was more than the sum of his expressed ideals.  It also includes his 
model of principled judicial performance.  While something should be said 
regarding his methodology of constitutional decision-making, his judicial be-
havior is better captured by reading his opinions than by trying to identify its 
components.  Nevertheless, three interconnected features seem apparent. 
First, Justice Brandeis’s approach to deciding constitutional cases was 
deeply empirical.  He eschewed absolutes and abstractions in a continuing ef-
fort to bring law into harmony with life.  “Knowledge is essential to under-
standing, and understanding should precede judging,” he wrote in a dissent.213
He believed that courts could not determine whether legislatures acted in an 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious manner without having a complete un-
derstanding of the facts that might have informed their outputs.  As Justice 
Frankfurter wrote on the fortieth anniversary of Brandeis’s appointment to the 
Court: “At a time when our constitutional law was becoming dangerously un-
responsive to important social changes, when decisions were rested on hollow 
formulas, themselves the product of limited experience, he insisted, as the 
great men of law have always insisted, that law must be sensitive to life.”214
Frankfurter continued, using Brandeis’s language that judgments regard-
ing whether legislative behavior was arbitrary and unreasonable “should be 
based upon a consideration of relevant facts, actual or possible—Ex facto jus 
oritur [The law arises from facts].  That ancient rule must prevail in order that 
we may have a system of living law.”215  In this respect, Brandeis stood apart 
not only from those committed to Lochnerian jurisprudence but to Justice 
Holmes, whose opinions often emphasized abstract principles untested against 
experience.
Moreover, Justice Brandeis viewed constitutional law as dynamic, not 
static, and as fundamentally about general purposes, not specific applica-
[https://perma.cc/XX8Z-NGQ8]; Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Fundraiser in New 
York City, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 2, 2015), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=111016 [https://perma.cc/8JF9-TPJ9]; Remarks at a Demo-
cratic National Committee Fundraiser in Potomac, Maryland, AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT
(Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=111018 [https://perma.cc/4RYU-8F6H]. 
213.  See Jay Burns Baking v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
214. Felix Frankfurter, The Moral Grandeur of Justice Brandeis, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 
11, 1956, reprinted in FELIX FRANKFURTER, OF LAWS AND LIFE & OTHER THINGS THAT MATTER:
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1956–1963, 58 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1965). 
215. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 600 (1917) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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tions.216  The Constitution afforded protections beyond those the Founding 
generation imagined.217  Interpreters should read the Fourth Amendment in 
light of its animating purposes rather than subject it to an “unduly literal con-
struction.”218  Nor should they limit the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures to the form the evil took in the 
Founders’ era: breaking and entering and taking.  Technology had evolved to 
give the government “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading pri-
vacy.”219  “Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific 
abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing 
world.”220  Similarly, speech must be given wide protection because of its crit-
ical role in a democracy: to allow individuals to develop and society to im-
prove.221  The Fifth Amendment required a grand jury presentment or indict-
ment as a prerequisite for a prosecution but “infamous crimes” invited 
reinterpretation to accommodate to changing conditions.222
Brandeis’s related beliefs in the value of experience and the dynamic na-
ture of law contributed to his humility as a jurist.  Judicial decisions were not 
carved in stone but were always subject to revision based on future develop-
ments.  “It is a peculiar virtue of our system of law that the process of inclu-
sion and exclusion, so often employed in developing a rule, is not allowed to 
end with its enunciation, and that an expression in an opinion yields later to 
the impact of facts unforeseen,” he wrote in a 1926 dissent.223
Justice Brandeis practiced judicial humility by his adherence to jurisdic-
tional rules and principles that limited the Court’s role and his belief that 
courts should defer to legislative judgment regarding economic matters.  Alt-
hough some have associated his commitment to judicial restraint with his pro-
gressive agenda224 or criticized his work as result-oriented, Brandeis’s practice 
of allowing procedural impediments to dictate his decisions suggests a princi-
pled appreciation of the limits imposed on courts.225  His votes often did not 
216. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472–74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
217. Id.
218. Id. at 476.
219. Id. at 473. 
220. Id. at 472. 
221. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
222. United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 451 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also 
BICKEL, supra note 109, at 106–08 (discussing Brandeis’s belief in, but omission of, language re-
garding “living Constitution” in order to gain Chief Justice Taft’s joinder to his dissent). 
223. Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609, 615, 619 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
224. See, e.g., PURCELL, supra note 25, at 122 (associating Brandeis’s “commitment to judicial 
restraint” with its “tactical” use to “defend Progressive values threatened by a hostile judiciary”). 
225. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring); New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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reflect his views on the merits of a dispute because jurisdictional or procedur-
al issues intervened.  He voted to uphold Anna Whitney’s conviction, for in-
stance, because she had not raised at trial the issue of whether her conduct 
presented a “clear and present danger.”226  In New State Ice, he deferred to the 
judgment of the Oklahoma state legislature in passing a measure that restrict-
ed competition even though the statute’s monopolistic character contradicted 
his deeply-held economic views.227  He admonished his colleagues that “in the 
exercise of this high power [of judicial review] we must be ever on our guard, 
lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles.”228  Though sympathetic to 
the Court’s resolution of the constitutional issues, Brandeis would not have 
reached the merits in Ashwander, because he thought the case not justicia-
ble.229
Some regard Brandeis’s majority opinion in Erie as hypocritical because it 
deviated from some of the rules he set forth two years earlier in Ashwander.
The parties had not argued regarding whether Swift should be overruled and 
Brandeis, for the Court, rested the decision on constitutional, rather than statu-
tory, grounds contrary to one of his prescriptions in Ashwander.  Justice 
Reed’s Erie concurrence suggested a statutory resolution that seemed more 
true to Ashwander.230
Yet Justice Brandeis’s opinion also might be viewed as judicial recogni-
tion that the power of the federal judiciary was limited.  It seems harsh to 
condemn Brandeis for overturning Swift if it and its progeny involved a usur-
pation of power by the federal judiciary in the first place.  On the contrary, it 
would seem appropriate, indeed commendable, for the Court to recognize the 
error of a course it had endorsed which had aggrandized the power of the fed-
eral judiciary at the expense of the state courts. Erie thus can most properly 
be seen as a remarkable example of the federal judiciary recognizing a limit 
on its own power even when doing so involved confessing past error and re-
linquishing power it had long asserted. Brandeis may have thought a statutory 
ruling unavailable since Congress’s failure to correct Justice Joseph Story’s 
reading of the Rules of Decision Act for nearly a century implied acquies-
cence in it.  Indeed, Brandeis had argued that the Court had more latitude to 
reexamine its constitutional holdings than its statutory interpretations.231
226. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 379 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
227. 285 U.S. at 309–10 (“The objections to the proposal are obvious and grave.  The remedy 
might bring evils worse than the present disease.  The obstacles to success seem insuperable.”). 
228. Id. at 311. 
229. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
For a fuller discussion of Ashwander, see supra pp. 360-361. 
230. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 90–92 (1938) (Reed, J., concurring). 
231. See, e.g., Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405–08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
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Whereas in International News Service v. Associated Press he dissented be-
cause he appreciated Congress’s superior competence to provide a remedy, in 
Erie he decided on constitutional grounds because he respected Congress’s 
implicit acquiescence in Swift’s statutory interpretation. 
Brandeis’s predicament in Erie reveals a further characteristic of his judi-
cial behavior.  Notwithstanding his ability to formulate foundational princi-
ples, he was ultimately a balancer.  He recognized that ideals often came into 
conflict and that at some point accommodations needed to be made to manage 
the inevitable tension.232  Thus, in Whitney he articulated a robust version of 
Free Speech but ruled against Anita Whitney on procedural 
grounds.233  In Ashwander, he was not unsympathetic to the Court’s ruling on 
the merits but thought principles of judicial behavior should prevent it from 
reaching those issues.234  And in Erie he reached out to decide a constitutional 
question, seemingly at odds with one of Ashwander’s teachings, in order to 
reverse what he regarded as an unconstitutional assumption of power by the 
federal judiciary in Swift v. Tyson.235  These results did not reflect inconsisten-
cy.  They were rather the product of a conscientious effort to manage princi-
ples in conflict. 
V. JUSTICE BRANDEIS
Brandeis believed that the Supreme Court was “a teacher to the nation of 
both scholarly and moral truths.”236  That understanding of the institution 
shaped his conception of his duty as a justice.  He sought to make his opinions 
instructive, not simply convincing, and he continued to rework them so they 
would teach, not simply persuade.237
One need only open a newspaper or a computer to be reminded that the 
dangers he warned of remain, in some respects in even more insidious forms 
today than when he wrote.  That Brandeis’s moral teachings have not pre-
vailed in the world in which we live does not mark him as a failure or render 
his principles irrelevant. They did not always prevail in his day either.  “If the 
lessons you have taught do not seem to have been learned very well yet, that 
is not for any lack on your part,” Elizabeth Brandeis Raushenbush wrote her 
dissenting).
232. See, e.g., Max Lerner, The Social Thought of Mr. Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE
BRANDEIS 7, 30 (Felix Frankfurter ed., 1932) (“At the basis of Mr. Justice Brandeis’s attitude toward 
the problem of regulation is his conviction that no rights are absolute.”). 
233. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
234. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 341 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
235. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69; Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346–48. 
236. MILLER, supra note 106, at 194. 
237. Id.
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father the day after he retired from the Court.238  Rather, a century after he 
joined the Court, Brandeis’s discretionary opinions provide a reservoir of 
moral concepts to help in considering many complicated constitutional chal-
lenges that face us still.  As Paul Freund observed in concluding a 1978 re-
membrance of Justice Brandeis, “The generation now coming of age would 
find a remarkably sympathetic guide to the perplexed in the life and works of 
Brandeis, if only they were made aware of this resource of wisdom.”239
238. Letter, February 14, 1939, quoted in MASON, supra note 1, at 634. 
239. Freund, A Law Clerk’s Remembrance, supra note 8, at 18 (alluding to Moses Maimoni-
des’s Guide for the Perplexed, which attempted to reconcile Aristotle’s theories with Jewish theolo-
gy).
